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ABSTRACT In this paper we analyzed the effects of tariffs on the whole milk pow-
der trade between Brazil and Argentina from 1990 to 2004. The methodology in-
cluded estimation of whole milk powder demands for Brazil and Argentina as mo-
nopolists, members of Mercosul, and world exporters; and simulation of Cournot 
games considering the trade of this product under alternative tariff policies. The 
results show that although the tariff impositions create trade distortions, this kind 
of policy was important to protect Brazil against illegal practices of trade and to 
increase its competitiveness against traditional international competitors.
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EFEITOS DE TARIFAS NO COMÉRCIO DE LEITE EM PÓ ENTRE O BRASIL 
E A ARGENTINA: UMA ANÁLISE COM TEORIA DOS JOGOS
RESUMO Neste artigo, analisaram-se os efeitos de tarifas no comércio de leite em 
pó entre o Brasil e a Argentina, no período de 1990 a 2004. A metodologia utilizada 
inclui a estimativa da demanda de leite em pó para o Brasil e a Argentina como 
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monopolistas, como membros do Mercosul e como exportadores mundiais, e a si-
mulação de jogos de Cournot, considerando o comércio deste produto sob diferen-
tes políticas alternativas de tarifas. Os resultados obtidos mostram que, embora a 
imposição de tarifas tenha criado distorções no comércio de leite em pó, este tipo 
de política foi importante para proteger o Brasil contra práticas ilegais de comércio 
e aumentar sua competitividade frente a competidores internacionais tradicionais. 
Palavras-chave: leite em pó, comércio internacional, tarifas, Mercosul
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, there has been a world tendency towards the devel-
opment of economic blocks motivated by the process of economic open-
ness to international trade and globalization. In 1988 Brazil and Argentina 
set in motion a process of integration for a common market by the end of 
1994. In 1992 Paraguay and Uruguay were invited to join the Southern 
Common Market Treaty (Mercosul). A Custom Union was created under 
the Ouro Preto Protocol signed in December 1994. In that occasion, the 
intrablock tariffs were eliminated and a Common External Tariff (CET) 
was instituted. 
In general, the trade liberalization affects the economic sectors differen-
tially in each country. In the case of Brazil, while the manufactured sector 
expanded its intrablock exports after the implementation of Mercosul, some 
agricultural/food sectors did not respond to the new situation with the 
speed and depth required in order to provide economic expansion, as was 
the case with the dairy sector. 
According to Lopes (1992), at the beginning of the integration process, 
the dairy sector was one of the most sensitive sectors in Brazil. This vulner-
ability was a consequence of the Brazilian government’s intervention in this 
sector for over 40 years through the control of milk prices and imports. Af-
ter the liberalization of the Brazilian milk market in 1991, the production 
expanded to non-traditional milk producing areas, and milk production 
increased substantially.
The Common External Tariff for dairy products became effective in 
Mercosul at the end of 1994. It was accorded that the powdered milk’s CET 
would be gradually reduced from 32% in 1995 to 16% in 2001. However, 
from 1994 to 1998, the overvalued exchange rate stimulated the entrance of 
milk powder in Brazil. In 1995, whole milk powder (WMP) Brazilian im-
ports reached the record level of 211 thousand tons, representing 105.5% of 
the national production. According to Sapya (2005), during the 1995-1999 
period, about 72% of the Argentinean powdered milk exports was destined 
to Brazil.
The largest obstacle faced by Brazilian milk producers in the 1990s was 
the existence of illegal trade practices. Argentinean producers were import-
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ing subsidized milk from the European Union (EU) and reselling it to Brazil. 
In an attempt to avoid these imports at artifi cial prices, the Brazilian gov-
ernment implemented changes in the dairy products trade. Milk powder 
entered the “exception list” of the Mercosul’s Common External Tariff. Bra-
zil imposed an anti-dumping duty on milk powder imports from New Zea-
land, the EU and Uruguay. Argentina negotiated a minimum export price of 
US$ 1,900 per metric ton for powdered milk exports to Brazil and also 
agreed to maintain the same tariff lines in order to avoid imports from oth-
er countries entering through its territory and eventually reaching Brazil.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of tariffs on the 
whole milk powder trade between Brazil and Argentina under the perspec-
tive of the game theory during the 1990-2004 period. Specifi cally, we esti-
mated whole milk powder demands for Brazil and Argentina — as mo-
nopolists, as members of Mercosul, and as world exports — and simulated 
sceneries considering the whole milk powder trade for Brazil and Argentina 
under alternative tariff policies.
In the next section, we present the methodology used in this paper. This 
methodology includes the trade between two countries modeled as Cournot 
games, the formulation of these games as mixed complementarity prob-
lems, the specifi cation of demand functions to be estimated by econometric 
methods, and the data and procedures used in this paper. The third section 
presents the results and discussion. Finally, in the fourth section, we present 
the concluding remarks. 
1. METHODOLOGY
1.1 Cournot’s duopolistic game
The imperfect competition theory has fundamentally changed the way 
economists think about international trade. The primary appeal of this the-
ory lies in the fact that it helps to explain certain features of modern trading 
patterns, which do not conform with the neo-classical theory. On the other 
hand, the game theory has been widely used to analyze imperfect competi-
tion in the international trade. According to Carlton and Perloff (2000), the 
game theory analyzes the interaction among rational agents that are not 
capable to completely predict the results of their decisions.  
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In a game between two countries, each country can improve its trade 
terms with the use of tariffs. However, in its absence, the game cannot be in 
the Nash Equilibrium (NE), since each country improves its payoff with the 
imposition of tariffs. Therefore, the NE with positive tariffs tends to be infe-
rior to the situation of free trade for both countries.
In a static Cournot model, countries have to choose their output levels at 
the same time and cannot make credible commitments, so no one can con-
vince the other that it will produce a large output. In the absence of govern-
ment intervention, these countries behave as Cournot duopolists. In this 
paper, we made the following assumptions: the countries produce identical 
products, so that the sum of their outputs equals the total output; the coun-
tries’ inverse demand curve is linear; and these countries produce at a con-
stant marginal cost. 
Consider a Cournot game between two countries with a homogeneous 
product. They face the following inverse demand curve:
P(Q) = a – bQ, Q = q1 + q2 (1)
where a and b are positive constants,  q1 is the output of Country 1 and q2 
the output of Country 2. Each country has a constant marginal cost of pro-
duction, c.
Imagine that Country 1’s government  imposes a specifi c tariff, t, on 
Country 2’s exports. Country 1’s profi t is:
 ∏1 = Pq1 – cq1 = aq1 – bq12 – bq1q2 – cq1 (2)
where equation (2) is obtained by substituting for P using equation (1). 
Since there is no use of tariffs in Country 2, its profi t is:
∏2 = aq1 – bq22 – bq2q1 – cq2 – tcq2 (3)
Country 1’s Cournot best-response function is determined by differenti-
ating ∏1 (equation 2) with respect to q1 and setting the result equal to zero. 
After rearranging terms, this condition is:
q1 = (a – bq2 – c) /2b (4)
Similarly, Country 2’s best-response function is:
q2 = (a – bq1 – c (1 + t)) /2b (5)
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The Nash-in-quantities equilibrium is obtained by solving equations (4) 
and (5) simultaneously for q2 and q1 (the intersection of the two best-re-
sponse functions):         
q1* = (a – c (1 – t)) /3b (6)
q2* = (a – c (1 + 2t)) /3b (7)
The government in Country 1 sets t to maximize its welfare. In choosing 
t, Country 1 must take into account the countries’ equilibrium response to t, 
which is given in equations (6) and (7). Thus, Country 1’s problem is:
Max ∏1* = aq1*(t) – bq1*(t)2 – bq1*(t)q2*(t) – cq1*(t)
 
t 
If we substitute  q1
* and  q2
* by their equations (6) and (7), we get:
Max ∏1*= a[(a – c (1 – t))/3b] – b[(a – c (1 – t))/3b]2 – b[(a – c (1– t))/3b]  t
[(a – c (1+ 2t))/3b] – c [(a – c (1– t))/3b] (8)
Rearranging the terms, we have: 
Max ∏1* = (a – c + ct)2 / 9b (9)
 t
When coming across the tariff imposition of Country 1, the profi t maxi-
mization function of Country 2 is:
Max ∏2*= aq2* (t) – bq2*(t)2 – bq2* (t) q1*(t) – cq2*(t) – tcq2*(t) 
 
t
Or, equivalently, after substitution of  q1
*and q2
* by their equations (6) 
and (7):
Max ∏2*= a[(a – c (1 + 2t))/3b] – b[(a – c (1 + 2t))/3b]2 – b[(a – c (1 + t
2t))/3b]
           
[(a – c (1 – t))/3b] – c [(a – c (1 + 2t))/3b]– tc [(a – c (1 + 2t))/3b] (10)
which can be simplifi ed to:
Max ∏2*= (a – c – 2ct)2/9b (11) t
We can observe that, in equations (9) and (11), the effect of the tariff 
is positive for Country 1 (which imposed the tariff) and negative for Coun-
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try 2. The modeling of games between two countries presented previously 
can be extended in several directions. In this paper, we considered the inclu-
sion of the variable income into the demand function of the players. This 
variable was considered exogenous in this new version of the model. As a 
result of that, the countries face a new inverse demand curve, that is:
 P(Q) = a – bQ + dY, Q = q1 + q2 and Y = y1 + y2   (12)
where y1 is Country 1’s income, y2 is Country 2’s income, and d is the (pos-
itive) coeffi cient of the total income, Y. The other variables were previously 
presented. Under this assumption, the countries’ profi t is:
∏1 = (a – bq1 – bq2 + dy1 + dy2) q1 – cq1 (13)
∏2 = (a – bq2 – bq1 + dy1 + dy2) q2 – cq2 – tcq2 (14)
Including the variable income into equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), 
(10) and (11), Countries 1 and 2 face their new maximization problems:
Max ∏1*= (a + dy1+ dy2 – c + ct)2 / 9b (15)
 
t
Max ∏2*= (a + dy1+ dy2 – c – 2ct)2/9b (16)
 t
If a third player is considered, the same analysis can be used to derive the 
Nash-Cournot Equilibrium. In deriving Country 1’s best-response func-
tion, we must consider the expected level of output presented by the other 
countries. All the countries decide the total output simultaneously. Thus, 
when three players play a Cournot game, the Nash Equilibrium presents dif-
ferent payoffs. See Gibbons (1992) and Carlton and Perloff (2000) for the 
modeling of a game with three or more players.
1.2 Mixed complementarity problem
In this paper, we formulated Cournot games as mixed complementarity 
problems to simplify the simulations with tariffs and their implementation 
in the GAMS software. A Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) consists 
of a system of linear or non-linear equations that are written as inequalities 
and are linked to bounded variables in complementarity slackness condi-
tions. The main advantage of an MCP formulation lies in its fl exibility and 
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speed in solving economic models, which result from the fact that Kuhn-
Tucker’s fi rst-order optimality conditions are used to set up the models. For 
details, see Rutherford (1995).
The formulation of a Cournot game as a Mixed Complementarity Prob-
lem assumes that the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium defi nes the market price 
and the level of production for each country, taking the fi rst-order condi-
tions into account for all countries (Ventosa et al. 2002).    
Given the linear inverse demand of powdered milk defi ned by equation 
(12), and considering the possibility that both countries use the same tariff, 
the countries’ profi t functions are:
∏1 = aq1 – bq12 – bq1q2 + dy1q1 + dy2q1 – cq1 – tcq1 (17)
∏2 = aq2 – bq22 – bq2q1 + dy1q2 + dy2q2 – cq2 – tcq2 (18)
 
To solve the Cournot’s duopolistic model as a MCP it is necessary to ob-
tain the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
Marginal conditions:









q1 ≥ 0; q2 ≥ 0  (21)
Slackness conditions:
q1 [a – 2bq1 – bq2 + dy1 + dy2  – c1 (1+ t1)]  =  0 (22)
q2 [a – 2bq2 – bq1 + dy1 + dy2  – c2 (1+ t2)]  =  0 (23)
Once the slackness conditions are obtained, it is necessary to transform 
these equations into the Mixed Complementarity Problem format. Accord-
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ing to Flakowski (2004), it is important to notice that only positive defi ned 
variables can be made complementary to inequalities or equations. How-
ever, it is not necessary to match free variables to equations; it is only re-
quired to have the same number of equations as free variables. For details, 
see Ferris and Munson (2000). In this paper, the level of production for each 
player, the total production and the market price are defi ned as positive 
variables. Those variables are associated to the equations of each country’s 
profi t, the equation of total production and the equation of market demand, 
respectively.
1.3 Econometric model
Before solving the Mixed Complementarity Problem, it is necessary to esti-
mate the market demands for whole milk powder (WMP). First, we esti-
mated individual market demands for Brazil and Argentina. After that, we 
estimated a market demand to simulate a game between both countries. 
Finally, we estimated a market demand to simulate a game between Brazil, 
Argentina and a third player, the Rest of the World. 
Specifi cally, those market demands were defi ned as:  
(a) Whole Milk Powder (WMP) demand for Brazil: 
QB = β11 – β21 PB + β31 RB +u1 (24)
(b) WMP demand for Argentina: 
QA = β12 – β22 PA + β32 RA +u2 (25)
(c) WMP combined demand for Brazil and Argentina: 
QAB = β13 – β23 PAB + β33 RA + β43 RB + u3 (26)
(d) WMP demand for Brazil, Argentina and the Rest of the World:
QM = β14 – β24 PI + β34 RM +u4 (27)
where QB = demanded quantity of WMP in Brazil, 1990-2004 (expressed in 
thousand tons); QA = demanded quantity of WMP in Argentina, 1990-2004 
(thousand tons); QAB = demanded quantity of WMP in Brazil and Argen-
tina, 1990-2004 (thousand tons); QM = demanded quantity of WMP in Bra-
zil, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, 1990-2004 (thousand tons); 
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PA = WMP domestic price in Argentina, 1990-2004 (US$/ton); PB = WMP 
domestic price in Brazil, 1990-2004 (US$/ton); PAB = WMP average price in 
Brazil and Argentina, 1990-2004 (US$/ton); PI = Oceania international 
WMP price (FOB), 1990-2004 (US$/ton); RA = Argentina’s real gross domes-
tic product (GDP), 1990-2004 (million pesos); RB = Brazil’s real gross do-
mestic product, 1990-2004 (million reals); RM = world’s gross domestic 
product real variation, 1990-2004 (annual percent change); βij (i = 1, 2, 3, 4; 
j = 1, 2, 3, 4) are the parameters to be estimated, and the error terms are 
represented by μi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
According to economic theory, we assumed that the parameters associ-
ated with prices are negative and those associated with income are positive. 
We assumed also that the error terms present mean zero and variance is 
constant.
1.4 Data and procedures
The demand equations for whole milk powder considering annual data cov-
ering the 1990-2004 period were estimated using the E-views econometric 
software. The time series data of WMP production and exports for Brazil, 
Argentina, New Zealand, and Australia were collected from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) through the Foreign Agricultural Ser-
vice (FAS). In this paper, we considered demanded quantity as the produced 
amount once the WMP stocks for Brazil and Argentina are held at insignifi -
cant levels. The time series data on WMP prices (US$/ton) for Brazil and 
Argentina were collected from the Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (SECEX) 
and the Secretaría de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación de la República Ar-
gentina (SAPyA), respectively. The time series of international WMP prices 
were obtained from the USDA. The Argentinean real GDP (used as proxy of 
the income) was taken from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
(INDEC). The Brazilian real GDP and the world’s gross domestic product 
real variation were taken from the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 
(IPEADATA).
The marginal costs of WMP production were taken from the dairy report 
of the International Farm Comparison Network (IFCN). In this paper, we 
assumed constant marginal cost. The WMP import tariffs for Brazil, Argen-
tina, Australia and New Zealand were taken from the United Nations Con-
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ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The parameters used for the 
numeric resolution of the games as mixed complementarity problems were 
the ones implemented by the GAMS software (General Algebraic Modelling 
System) using the PATH solver. The codes for implementation of Cournot’s 
duopolistic game in GAMS can be found in the Appendix (fi gure 1a). 
In this paper, we considered the main changes in the whole milk powder 
trade between Brazil and Argentina from 1990 to 2004 as a reference to de-
fi ne the different scenarios.  In the fi rst two scenarios, we proposed to mea-
sure the effects of an autarchy on the WMP production for Brazil and Argen-
tina in each domestic market. The third scenario simulated games between 
both countries on WMP production, starting with free trade all the way to 
the highest level of protection through prohibitive tariffs. Finally, the last 
scenario intended to simulate a three player game, considering Brazil, Ar-
gentina and the Rest of the World (New Zealand and Australia) as world 
exporters of whole milk powder.
2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Before estimating the equations of the whole milk powder market demands, 
we tested the time series for unit roots. Dickey-Fuller’s unit root test indi-
cated that the time series used to estimate the Brazilian market demand 
(equation 24), the combined demand for Brazil and Argentina (equation 
26), and the combined demand for Brazil, Argentina and the Rest of the 
World (equation 27) are stationary at the 5% level. However, by the Dick-
Fuller test, the QA time series (Argentinean market demand) is stationary 
only at the 15% level. Unlikewise, the Phillips-Perron’s unit root test indi-
cated that this time series (QA) is stationary at the 5% level. Based on these 
results, we considered all time series used in this paper stationary.
2.1 Scenarios 1 and 2: Brazil and Argentina as monopolists
In this scenario, we assumed that the Brazilian milk powder producers do 
not face foreign competitors in the domestic market. First, we estimated the 
Brazilian whole milk powder market demand. The estimated results are 
found in table 1a. The variables Intercept, WMP market price and Brazilian 
income are statistically signifi cant at the 5% level. In the estimated model, 
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the R
2 
value indicates that the variables used in the model explain 89.99% of 
the total variation in WMP demand. 
The negative value of the price coeffi cient indicates that a US$ 1 increase 
per WMP ton reduces the demanded quantity in 68.9 tons. The demand 
price elasticity price of –0.5217 indicates that the 10% increase in the WMP 
price reduces its demanded quantity in 5.22%. Martins (1992) obtained 
milk demand price-elasticities between –0.1 and –0.6. According to Gomes 
(2002), the low milk demand price-elasticity in Brazil, around –0.5, com-
bined with the growing supply price elasticity helps to explain the great os-
cillations on the milk price received by the Brazilian milk producers.
Assuming the monopolist maximizes profi t, the profi t maximizing out-
put level is found by setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. At this 
point, Brazil output level reached 214.84 thousand tons.  From 1990 to 
2004, Brazil consumed an average of 323.77 thousand tons of milk powder 
per year. The WMP consumption increased from 185 thousand tons in 1991 
to 428 thousand tons in 2004 (USDA 2005). Under the same assumptions, 
the optimal market price is equal to US$ 3,398.47. Over the period from 
1990 to 2004, the average price was US$ 1,861/ton. The lowest price in the 
Brazilian market, US$ 1,390/ton, in 1991, is 37% inferior to the highest price 
found in 2000, US$ 2,210. These results show that if there was a monopoly 
in the Brazilian WMP market, there would be a consumer’s surplus reduc-
tion due to an increase in the product price and a decrease in the quantity 
supplied.   
Table 1a: Estimation Results for WMP market demand in Brazil
Dependent Variable: QB
Sample: 1990-2004   
 Variable  Coeffi cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Intercept  267.4043 44.8179 5.9664 0.0000*
PB  –0.0689 0.0277 –2.4833 0.0288**
RB  0.1444 0.0139 10.3425 0.0000*
R2  0.8999  F-statistic 53.9549
Adjusted R2  0.8832  Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5632   
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Afterward, Argentina was considered a monopolist in its domestic mar-
ket. The coeffi cients of the Argentinean WMP market demand are present-
ed in table 2a. The variables Intercept and domestic market price (RA) are 
statistically signifi cant at a 1% and 10% level, respectively. The R
2
 value 
indicates that 81.44% of the variation in the demanded quantity of Argen-
tinean whole milk powder is explained by the predetermined variables 
of the model. The negative value of the market price (PA) indicates that a 
US$ 1 increase per WMP ton reduces the demanded quantity in 60.5 tons. 
In terms of the demand price-elasticity, the value of –0.7319 denotes that a 
10% increase in the market price reduces the WMP demanded quantity in 
7.32%.
In this scenario, where Argentina is considered an autarchy, the point 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost and maximizes the profi ts is 
equal to 160.97 thousand tons of WMP. The whole milk powder consump-
tion in Argentina increased from 83 thousand tons in 1990 to its highest 
value of 243 thousand tons during 1997-1998. Under monopoly, the WMP 
market price practiced by Argentina is US$ 3,284/ton. This value is signifi -
cantly superior to the highest price of US$ 2,540/ton in 1993, and the lowest 
price of US$ 1,440, found during the Argentinean economic crisis of 2002. 
From 1990 to 2004, the average consumption of WMP in Argentina was 
equivalent to 165.13 thousand tons per year, while the domestic price pre-
sented the average value of US$ 1,997.67/ton. As observed before for Brazil, 
the autarchy in the Argentinean market reduces the output level and in-
creases the domestic price.
Table 2a: Estimation Results for WMP market demand in Argentina
Dependent Variable: QA
Sample: 1990-2004   
 Variable Coeffi cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Intercept 206.4428 63.4123 3.2555  0.0099*
PA –0.0605 0.0322 –1.8754 0.0935***
RA 0.3724 0.2762 1.3478 0.2106 ns 
R2 0.8608  F-statistic 18.5529
Adjusted R2 0.8144  Prob (F-statistic) 0.0003
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5526     
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2.2 Scenario 3: Cournot duopolistic game between Brazil and Argentina
The fi rst simulation of this scenario assumed the absence of WMP import 
tariffs between Brazil and Argentina. These countries, while members of 
Mercosul, established a Common External Tariff for non-member coun-
tries. We formulated a Cournot game assuming Brazil and Argentina as 
duopolists. The estimation results of equation (26) are presented in table 3a. 
The variables Argentinean income (RA) and market price (PAB) are statisti-
cally signifi cant at a 10% level. The variables Intercept and Brazilian income 
(RB) are statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. The high R2 value indicates 
that the model accounts effi ciently for the behavior of the dependent vari-
able. The negative coeffi cient of market price (PAB) points out that a US$ 1 
increase per WMP ton reduces the demanded quantity by 196.2 tons. The 
demand price-elasticity indicates that a 10% increase in the WMP price re-
duces the amount in 9.13%, ceteris paribus.
The Brazilian income coeffi cient (0.6807), higher than the Argentinean 
income coeffi cient (0.4897), indicates that an increase in consumer’s income 
in the fi rst country has a larger effect in the total demanded quantity. In fact, 
Brazilian’s economic stabilization plan reduced the infl ation and provided 
a real increase in income. As a result, it contributed signifi cantly to an in-
crease in the consumption of dairy products by people of lower income, as 
a consequence of their high price elasticity.   
The results of the fi rst simulation using GAMS were obtained consider-
ing the estimated coeffi cients of equation (26). The market price established 
in this game is equal to US$ 1,983.22 per WMP ton. Argentina and Brazil 
produced 226.76 and 236.14 thousand tons, respectively.  
Table 3a: Estimation results for WMP market demand between Argentina and Brazil
Dependent Variable: QAB
Sample: 1990-2004   
 Variable Coeffi cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Intercept 892.1364 122.0190 7.3114 0.0000*
PAB –0.1962 0.0665 –2.9504 0.0765***
RA 0.4897 0.2639 1.8556 0.0906***
RB 0.6807 0.0462 14.7336  0.0000*
R2 0.9745  F-statistic 140.2697
Adjusted R2 0.9676  Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9277   
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During the fi rst stage of the Real Plan (1994-1998) the WMP production 
in Brazil increased 42.86%, reaching 240 thousand tons of whole milk pow-
der in 1998 (USDA 2005). However, the high level of WMP domestic con-
sumption and the overvalued exchange rate stimulated the increase of the 
WMP Brazilian imports over this period.
In spite of presenting favorable conditions of development, the great 
transformations in the Argentinean dairy sector did not occur until the end 
of the 1980’s because of an inappropriate economic environment. The stabi-
lization plan, combined with the implementation of Mercosul, promoted an 
expressive increase in Argentinean WMP production and exports. Over the 
period from 1990 to 2004, Argentina’s WMP production increased 254.84%, 
reaching the record level of 244 thousand tons in 1999 (USDA 2005).  
In 2001, WMP was included in Brazil’s Common External Tariff excep-
tion list. After that, a 27% tax is charged in addition to the import tariff of 
18.5% to all markets, including Mercosul members. The new game between 
Argentina and Brazil was simulated considering the WMP import tariff 
changes adopted by Brazil. In this second simulation, the imposition of tar-
iffs in the WMP trade fl ow between Brazil and Argentina was considered. 
The new market price was US$ 2,077.86/ton, 4.86% higher than the fi rst 
simulation. Under these conditions, Brazil produced 254.72 thousand tons 
of WMP. According to USDA (2005), Brazil WMP output level was equivalent 
to 256 thousand tons in 2000.
After the inclusion of the whole milk powder in the exception list of the 
Common External Tariff, Argentina reduced its production in 13.9%, to 
229.61 thousand tons. Brazil’s currency devaluation in January 1999 and the 
continuous growth of the Brazilian WMP production led Argentinean WMP 
to become less competitive. In fact, according to Spaya (2005), the Argentin-
ean whole milk powder production fell from 244 thousand tons in 1999 to 
208 thousand tons in 2000, representing a 14.75% decrease.
The third simulation of this scenario tried to quantify the effects of a 
potential decision by Argentina to retaliate its main trade partner by apply-
ing the same tariff level adopted by Brazil. Considering Argentina’s retalia-
tion, the new WMP market price is US$ 2,196.63/ton, the highest value of 
this scenario. Brazil reduces its production to 208.31 thousand tons, the 
smallest output level considering the other game payoffs. After retaliating 
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Brazil, Argentina’s production is 252.84 thousand tons. Even equalizing the 
import tariff level, Argentina does not overcome its fi rst game’s output level 
in which the use of tariffs did not exist for either country. However, without 
cooperation it may be diffi cult for the two countries to realize the superior 
free trade outcome. In a non-cooperative game, if both countries begin with 
free trade, each country has an individual incentive to deviate and imple-
ment tariffs.
In the fi nal simulation of this scenario, we considered what would be 
prohibitive WMP tariff for both countries. When the Brazilian WMP import 
tariff increased to 327% there was no incentive to the international trade. In 
other words, this was the fi rst tariff level at which the second player did not 
produce any amount. When the Argentinean WMP import tariff reached 
232%, Brazil was not motivated to produce whole milk powder. In fact, ac-
cording to Gibson et al. (2001), in some countries the import tariffs on dairy 
products reach prohibitive tariff levels. Japan, for instance, has an average 
import tariff for dairy products equivalent to 322%. 
As it can be observed, the adoption of tariff practices in the whole milk 
powder trade by Brazil and Argentina reduces the total amount of produc-
tion for both countries. As the market price behaves inversely to the total 
output level, the price goes up as the tariff level increases. The fi nal out-
come, after retaliation occurs, is very likely to cause reductions in the wel-
fare of both countries. This occurs because each trade policy results in a 
decline of the consumer’s surplus of both countries.
2.3 Scenario 4: three player Cournot game 
(Brazil, Argentina and the Rest of the World)
The simulation of the fourth scenario illustrates a three player Cournot 
game considering tariff imposition and free trade. In this game, Brazil and 
Argentina are considered as world WMP exporters inserted together in the 
international trade against a third player formed by New Zealand and Aus-
tralia. According to Sapya (2005), New Zealand and Australia were the main 
WMP exporters in 2003, representing a share of 37% and 14% of the world’s 
total net WMP exports, respectively. The estimated parameters of the de-
mand equation are presented in table 4a. 
The variables Intercept and Trend are statistically signifi cant at a 5% 
level. World’s income is not statistically signifi cant. The R
2
 value for equa-
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tion (27) indicates that the three independent variables explain 88.16% of 
the variation in the world’s demanded quantity of WMP. The demand price-
elasticity value of 0.5785 indicates that a 10% increase in the market price 
reduces the WMP demanded quantity in 5.78% .
Considering the estimated coeffi cients, two Cournot games were simu-
lated among the three players. The fi rst game was simulated considering the 
current WMP tariff levels adopted by the countries. According to Unctad 
(2005), the whole milk powder import tariffs for Brazil, Argentina and the 
Rest of the World (Australia and New Zealand) correspond to 27%, 16% 
and 5%, respectively. Under these conditions, Argentina, Brazil and the Rest 
of the World produced 208.38, 387.79 and 423.77 thousand tons of whole 
milk powder, respectively. 
Although Argentina produced and exported record levels of whole milk 
powder during the 1990’s, it stagnated in the subsequent years. The eco-
nomic recession that began in 2000 and the following economic crisis in 
2002 hit the Argentinean dairy sector very hard. However, the strong de-
valuation of 2002 and very fi rm world prices in the past years are driving a 
strong recovery of that sector in Argentina. According to Saypa (2005), Ar-
gentina produced approximately 204 thousand tons of WMP in 2002, 2.15% 
above the estimated amount for this player.
In Brazil, in spite of the vertiginous growth of milk production in the 
1990’s, the output level was still insuffi cient to supply the domestic con-
sumption. After 2001, Brazilian exports of whole milk powder began to ob-
tain prominence positions. The dairy sector registered its fi rst trade surplus 
Table 4a: Estimation Results for WMP market demand
between Argentina, Brazil and the Rest of the World
Dependent Variable: QM
Sample: 1990-2004   
 Variable Coeffi cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Intercept 1529.992 294.1752 5.2001 0.0003*
PI –0.313798 0.140538 –2.2328 0.0473**
RM 28.19297 78.42446 0.3595   0.7260 ns
@trend 128.0171 23.86531 5.2384  0.0003*
R2 0.8816   F-statistic 27.2906
Adjusted R2 0.8492   Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.6309   
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in 2004, as the value of dairy exports surpassed that of imports. The increase 
of import tariffs, the exchange rate depreciation, the prohibition of import-
ed powdered milk in the federal government’s social programs and the in-
crease in fi tosanitary measures support higher Brazilian WMP production. 
In the fi rst game of this scenario, Brazilian’s production achieved a similar 
value to the observed amount of 390 thousand tons in 2003, as indicated in 
USDA (2005).
The estimated production of player Rest of the World was 22% inferior 
to the average volume produced by Australia and New Zealand from 1990 to 
2004, about 543 thousand tons of whole milk powder (USDA 2005). This 
difference can be attributed to the fact that Australia and New Zealand, be-
sides having higher production costs than Brazil and Argentina, are tradi-
tional exporters of powdered milk. Therefore, they have consolidated mar-
ket positions for their powdered milk through preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) and international sale contracts. Since we did not consider these is-
sues in the simulations, the model did not capture such effects.
The international price of WMP in the fi rst game of this scenario was 
US$ 2,044.77/ton. The American dollar depreciation relative to the Euro, the 
New Zealand and the Australian dollar can be considered as a decisive factor 
in the increase of WMP prices. According to OCDE (2005), the international 
WMP price increased from US$ 1,340 in 2001 to US$ 2,108.65 in 2004.
In the second simulation of this scenario, we intended to quantify the 
impact if free trade was assumed among the three countries. In other words, 
what would happen if the three players eliminated import tariffs? Under 
these conditions, Brazil reduced its output level by 31 thousand tons. It is 
noticed that the compensatory measures against Argentina and New Zea-
land and the inclusion of WMP in the “exception list” of the Common Ex-
ternal Tariff of Mercosul allowed Brazil to improve its terms of trade. 
Once we assumed free trade, Argentina and the Rest of the World in-
creased their output level. The Argentinean powdered milk presents the 
smallest production cost of the three players, so the elimination of tariffs 
improved its terms of trade. Under these conditions, Argentina obtained an 
increase of 30.76%, producing 271.88 thousand tons, its highest value con-
sidering all scenarios. Player Rest of the World presented a positive but 
smaller impact facing trade liberalization, increasing its output level in 
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5 thousand tons and reaffi rming New Zealand’s position as the world’s larg-
est WMP net exporter. 
When a country like Brazil sets trade policies to improve its terms of 
trade, there is a subsequent reduction in world effi ciency. The elimination 
of tariffs provided an increase of consumer’s surplus through the combina-
tion of lower prices and larger output level. The total amount produced by 
the three players increased 4% after trade liberalization, while the market 
price of US$ 1,914.42/ton is 6.35% inferior to the game with tariffs.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Since the implementation of Mercosul, the calendar of negotiations among 
member countries has been intensely focused on dealing with trade con-
fl icts. Over the last years, whole milk powder has created trade divergences 
between Brazil and Argentina. In this paper, we analyzed the effects of tariffs 
on whole milk powder trade fl ow between Brazil and Argentina from 1990 
to 2004. We formulated tariff games among countries as Mixed Comple-
mentarity Problems and developed their implementation in GAMS.
When there were no tariff impositions between Argentina and Brazil, the 
fi rst country reached a higher output level. Then, after the Brazilian govern-
ment implemented WMP import tariffs over Argentina, Brazil got a better 
payoff due to changes in its terms of trade. As expected in the hypothesis of 
retaliation, Argentina would produce more than Brazil and the market price 
would be higher. 
In the three player game with current WMP tariff levels, Brazil got its 
highest output of all scenarios. Once free trade was considered, players Ar-
gentina and the Rest of the World increased their output level while Brazil 
reduced its production. 
Besides possibly representing a loss in terms of society’s welfare, indeed 
WMP import tariffs have been important to protect Brazil’s dairy sector 
from illegal practices of international trade. Therefore, it can be interesting 
for Brazil to maintain import tariffs as an opportunity to improve its terms 
of trade, to increase its competitiveness against traditional international 
competitors and to consolidate its recent position as a dairy exporter.
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1a: Codes for Cournot duopolist game with tariffs as a MCP in GAMS 
Scalars
 a          intercept /4151.996996/
 b          inclination/4.664788/
 c1         marginal cost country 1 /624/
 c2         marginal cost country 2 /780/
 t1         import tariff to country 1 /0.455/
 t2         import tariff to country 2 /0/
 d          income coeffi cient   /7.132913/
Positive Variables
 q1        output level country 1 
 q2       output level country 1 
 qt        total output
 p          demand function
 yt         total income
 y1      income country 1
 y2        income country 2
Equations
 profi t1             profi t condition country 1
 profi t2             profi t condition country 2
 price             demand condition
 output         output condition
 income  total income condition 
 income1             income condition country 1
 income2          income condition country 2
 profi t1..           2*b*q1 + b*q2 – d*y1 – d*y2 = g = a – c1*(1 + t1);
 priofi t2..           b*q1 + 2*b*q2 – d*y1 – d*y2 = g = a – c2*(1 + t2);
 price..             p = g = a – b*q1 – b*q2 + d*y1 + d*y2;
 output..       q1 + q2 = g = qt;
 income..            y1 + y2 = g = yt;
 income1..          y1 = g = 0;
 income2..          y2 = g = 0;
 Cournot model    
   profi t1.q1
                    profi t2.q2
                   price.p
                    output.qt
                    income.yt
                    income1.y1
                    income2.y2/;
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